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In a recent article appearing in these pages,' Professor Mark Sagoff
proposed "a nonutilitarian rationale . . . to support protectionist
policies,"2 a rationale he sought to ground in America's cultural his-
tory and in its constitutional structure.
Sagoff's is a powerful and elegant pen, and we are all in his debt
for the way he has marshalled literary and historical materials to
buttress his thesis. But the thesis itself seems to me as incomplete
and misleading as it is simple. Here's how it goes: We all know
"what ideals we shall serve." They are "freedom, integrity, justice,
intelligence, power."3 The symbols of those ideals have traditionally
(in our history and literature) been such things as "the wilderness,
the deer, the bear, the eagle, a rapid river."4 To respect those natural
entities is to respect the qualities they exemplify or express; to lay
them waste is to abandon those qualities as our ideals.5 Thus the
"obligation to protect nature ... is an obligation to our cultural tra-
dition, to the values which we have cherished and in terms of which
nature and this nation are still to be described."6 Moreover, since
citizens surely have as much right to participate in the nation's cul-
ture as in its politics, it follows for Sagoff that the very structure of
our Constitution entitles citizens to enjoin developmental plunder
of the public environment as "interference with the protection of
[our] paradigms." 7 Thus is outlined the "hard work needed to estab-
lish" a moral theory that can substitute for the "trenchant," "me-
ticulous," and "lucid" argument of the "utilitarian philosophers." s
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
I. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Sagoff].
2. Id. at 264.
3. Id. at 243.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 228, 241.
6. Id. at 265.
7. Id. at 266 n.110.
8. Id. at 216. Sagoff asserts these high qualities for utilitarianism in the course of at-
tacking the substitute I sketch in Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Plastic
Trees].
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It is not my purpose here to detail the technical deficiencies in
Sagoff's proposal-including its striking inattention to the relevant
judicial and scholarly antecedents9 and its casual mishandling of the
pertinent doctrines' 0-but rather to focus on its more fundamental
flaws, whether as constitutional theory, as moral philosophy, or as
cultural history.
I
We may observe at the outset that Sagoff promises a good bit more
than he delivers. Far from a rationale for protectionist policies, he
presents at best an argument against blacktopping the entire country.
What his thesis requires, after all, is simply that some symbols of
the wild and the untamed be left intact; most of the environment
could happily be destroyed, most species plundered, within the thin
constraint set by his argument. Thus, even if people can "demand
that the mountains be left as a symbol of the sublime,"" a quality
which Sagoff assures us "is extremely important in our cultural his-
tory," 2 all this gives us is the not too surprising news that a pro-
posal to flatten virtually every hilltop would offend basic principles.
For someone who wryly notes that even "Smokey the Bear does not
tell us about our obligation to our furry companions without giving
us a little analysis about how that obligation is to be carried out,"' 3
Sagoff is amazingly stingy with his own instructions.
II
An even more basic difficulty with Sagoff's thesis is its strangely
static conception of symbolism. He chides those for whom "it is no
longer a bear but a beverage which is wild and free," or for whom
9. Courts have been notably inhospitable, for example, to claims that a "natural"
environment is protected by the federal constitution. See, e.g., Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972). Sagoff addresses neither such judicial precedents
nor the considerable body of scholarly comment directed to proposals much like his. See,
e.g., Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. La. L. REV. 32, 45-51 (1970); Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional
Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J.
203 (1974); Pettigrew, A Constitutional Right of Freedom from Ecocide, 2 ENVIR. L. REv.
1 (1971); Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a Constitutional
Avenue, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 134 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970); Note, Toward
a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970). For a fairly skeptical
view, see Hanks & Hanks, The Right to a Habitable Environment, in THE RIGHTS or
AMERICANS 146, 149-54 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 238
(1971); cf. Baude, Note: Constitutional Right to a "Decent Environment," in C. MEYERS &
A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 350-51 (1971).
10. For example, he cavalierly treats the sticky issues of standing and state action.
Sagoff 266 n.l10, 267.
11. Id. at 266.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 217.
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"[plower, as we now understand it, has nothing to do with nature"
but "is expressed by... a lot of engine under the hood."'14 Not a salu-
tary image, I agree, but in the end it is his undoing. For he begins
his essay 15 by praising a Science article extolling plastic trees' 0-the
article which argued that "the demand for rare environments is a
learned one"' 7 and that "conscious public choice can manipulate this
learning so that the environments which people learn to use and
want reflect environments that are likely to be available at low
cost.""' If the capacity to retrain consumer preference provides as
savage a reductio of utilitarian arguments for natural preservation as
Sagoff thinks,'0 then the great puzzle is why the capacity to alter
symbolic associations does not provide an equally savage reductio of
arguments from metaphor and cultural tradition. As to that puzzle,
Sagoff offers no clues. He recognizes, as of course he must, that tech-
nological creations and scientific images may come to replace "natural"
symbols of freedom, power, or integrity.20 He does not deny, as of
course he cannot, that the proponents of resource development and
exploitation could well help to "engineer" such replacements as a way
of keeping intact certain underlying ideals. His only refrain is that
the meaning of the ideals would be altered by a shift in the objects
serving as their paradigms. 21 Never mind that he doesn't say why this
would necessarily be a bad thing; that goes to a deeper flaw in Sa-
goff's method, a flaw to be examined later (in part III). The problem
to which I point here is a simpler one: he never establishes the as-
sertion as a matter of fact.
Oh, he offers an elaborate argument that is supposed to do the
trick. But once its intricacies are folded away, it is revealed as quite
inadequate to the task. The argument starts with a long excursion into
the history of American letters from roughly 1620 to 1950.22 The up-
shot of it all seems to be that, as so many have observed before, the
"nature" that earlier American thinkers sought to conquer assumed
a dramatically different role around the middle of the 18th century
as the city came to represent a sort of hell and the wilderness a sort
of heaven. (One learns almost as much from that famous New Yorker
14. Id. at 246.
15. Id. at 205-13.
16. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENcE 446 (1973).
17. Id. at 451.
18. Id. at 453.
19. Sagoff 207.
20. Id. at 228, 237, 246.
21. Id. at 228, 264.
22. Id. at 226-44.
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cartoon in which one pilgrim, leaning over the edge of a vessel one
imagines to be the Mayflower, tells another: "Religious freedom is
my immediate goal, but my long-range plan is to go into real estate.")
Sagoff then follows with an elaborate exegesis of aesthetics,23 build-
ing mainly on Nelson Goodman's work, in order to establish (with,
one must admit, loving attention and real elegance) the unsurprising
proposition that the qualities and ideals an object expresses (an art
object, a piece of furniture, a mountain) are not wholly arbitrary-
are not more so, at any rate, than are its more literal, physical prop-
erties like color or size. But Sagoff treats this proposition as if it
somehow established the altogether different contention that the
symbolic meanings of objects, the metaphorical meanings they "pos-
sess," are not "subjective"-not dependent on the personal histories and
perspectives of observers. 24 One can see why Sagoff wishes to reach
such a conclusion; it might let him argue that certain natural ob-
jects uniquely exemplify or symbolize our ideals, 20 so that one could
not hope to transfer the symbol for intelligence, for example, from
the owl to the computer, or the symbol for freedom from the eagle
to the aircraft, without adversely altering what is meant by "intelli-
gence" or by "freedom." But much as one can sympathize with the
wish, one cannot accept the assertion. A thing can plainly be sub-
jective without being in the least arbitrary, for to be arbitrary is
to be without understandable cause, without explanation-and sub-
jectivity reduces to the inexplicable only in the most impoverished
of world views.26 Sagoff attempts to save his position by proposing
the constraint of classical art criticism; 27 in effect, if the vulgar masses
(or any individual) can be persuaded to substitute the jet turbine
for the eagle as a symbol of freedom, the art critic will pronounce
them wrong and expel them from the culture. But even assuming so
monolithic a consensus in the arts themselves, one is at a loss to
understand how the views of so rare a professional elite can determine
the viability of an alternative symbolic structure for the nation as
a whole.
Put more affirmatively, just as objects of art and especially works
of artistic genius represent deliberate symbolic creations, so human
enterprise generally, in the media no less than in the museum and
23. Id. at 249-64.
24. Id. at 250, 262.
25. Id. at 259.
26. See Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 363-65 (1973); Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. &' PUB. AFF. 66, 100 n.95 (1972).
27. Sagoff 262-63.
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in high technology no less than in the craftsman's studio, has always
been a dynamic source of fantasy and imagery. 28 Nor need one be a
devotee of electronic sculpture to see in modern science and science-
based technology fertile new fields for the generation of image and
metaphor.29 Lions and serpents have, after all, spent much of the
symbolic force they once possessed. To entertain the possibility that
eagles and whales may be the next to go, and that spaceships and
submarines may one day be capable of replacing them in our col-
lective fantasies without seriously eroding the ideals they symbolize,
is not to assert that symbolic meanings are arbitrary but simply to
recognize that they are historically contingent rather than immutably
fixed by an order outside of time. It is to acknowledge that metaphor
is variable rather than uniquely determined by a Volksgeist unam-
biguously accessible to those with the appropriate cultural expertise.
And once that recognition has taken place, there is simply no reason
left to suppose that a commitment to particular ideals necessarily
entails a commitment to preserve the natural objects that have come
to symbolize those ideals in our culture.
III
So odd, indeed, is Sagoff's seeming fixation on the static character
of the symbolic network he seeks to defend that one is led to wonder
not only about the limits of his argument but also about its dangers.
There is, to be blunt, an aggressive nostalgia about his entire mode
of discourse; to environmentalists who see their mission as a celebration
of life and vitality, Sagoff's will seem a strangely dusty brief in nature's
behalf. To be sure, he offers the customary concession that "nothing
is sacred" and that "everything changes," 30 but he offers it regretfully,
in the course of enshrining the past and freezing the present. "The
responsibility to the wilderness," he argues, "is a recognition of its
qualities both present and past; and it requires us to imitate these
qualities." 31 To imitate theml It is one thing to say that we cannot
discern our purpose without perceiving our past; that is the deepest
promise of history. It is quite another to say, as Sagoff seems to, that
our past can show us how "to make out the nature of our responsi-
28. See, e.g., Smith, Art, Technology, and Science: Notes on Their Historical Interaction,
11 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 493 (1970); White, Cultural Climates and Technological
Advance in the Middle Ages, 2 VIATOR: MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES 171 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Schwitzgebel, Aesthetic Directions for Technology, 43 SOUNDINGS 293 (1970).
30. Sagoff 267.
31. Id. at 241.
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bilities."32 This is historicism run wild; it is the ancient and long
discarded thesis that what ought to be is fully contained in what
has been and what is." Make no mistake about it: For all his trans-
cendent inclinations to see in nature only a mirror for cultural and
intellectual history, Sagoff is firmly rooted in the tradition of im-
manence, the tradition that would sanctify the present beyond all
change.
34
I have elsewhere argued that resurrecting any such tradition as a
means of preserving nature (if it were possible to do so) would be pro-
foundly unwise; 35 and John Passmore has shown that a restoration of
immanence would, in any event, be unlikely to do much for the natural
environment in whose behalf its advocates urge its return.36 What re-
mains to be explored is how Sagoff found himself in so odd a posi-
tion, and whether any nature-respecting alternatives to immanence
might be available.
IV
How he found himself there is the easier of the two puzzles to
address. He did so, I think, by asking himself the wrong question.
Sagoff asked how to justify respecting "nature enough to leave it
alone."37 Of course, that gives the game away. For the only way to
justify so reverential a posture toward the natural order is to embrace
one or another variant of the view that human consciousness ought
to remain subservient to the biological and physical world of which
it is a part-that man should serve rather than creatively shape his
environment. At the other extreme, of course, is the manipulative,
dominating view of environment as pure resource, as material without
intrinsic significance, a means to be consumed by the human will in
the service of its changing ends. The right question to ask, it has
seemed to me,3 8 is how to avoid both poles of this dichotomy, both
the emptiness of choice without commitment to principle and the
stagnation of "natural" principles incapable of change.
Sagoff seems to recognize this as the overriding issue when he ob-
serves that want-maximizing policies "will be no better, morally or spir-
32. Id. at 224.
33. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE * book III, pt. I, § i.
34. See generally R. BELLAH, Religious Evolution, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELI-
GION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD 23, 27 (1970); H. WOLFSON, Spinoza and the Religion
of the Past, in RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY: A GROUP OF ESSAYS 246-49 (1961).
35. See Plastic Trees 1337-38.
36. See J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND
WESTERN TRADITIONS 173-95 (1974).
37. Sagoff 241.
38. See Plastic Trees 1338.
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itually, than the interests they serve." 39 The observation is an ancient
one; in addressing it several years ago, I made the admittedly obvious
point that "instrumental methods, by their very definition, cannot
address the question of what the chooser's ultimate system of ends
should be." 40 Yet Sagoff seems to think that I, and others writing in this
mode, have been concerned to remain within the philosophy of want-
maximization-to shape a justification for nature-respecting policies
"without compromising the assumption that good policies rest on the
satisfaction of wants."'' 4 Nothing could be further from the truth. And
it is Sagoff's confusion on this score that leads him into a neat but
ultimately extraneous attack on my earlier article about plastic trees.
His method is to caricature the argument of that article. Here is
his disarmingly simple version: Disregarding the wants of "animals
and other natural things" 42 is wrong; hence, as the utilitarians knew
all along, "averaging in" such wants along with human ones is right.43
But, Sagoff strategically asks, how are we to know where this cal-
culus leads? After all, animals benefit from "artificial" care and
feeding no less than people do, and even a mountain might "prefer"
to host a ski resort.44 Hence, Sagoff's elaborate put-on continues, "na-
ture" stands unprotected from "progress" by the stratagem (which
he thinks is mine) of factoring nature's "wants" into the policymaking
equation. The problem, Sagoff then announces with an air of surprise,
is thus not so much the homocentric character of that equation; it is
rather the equation's exclusive concern with wants.45 An excellent
point-one with which I have agreed for some time.46 If we seek only
to maximize the satisfaction of wants, it may turn out to make little
difference in the long run how much we broaden the class of en-
tities whose wants we regard as relevant.
The need, then, is to move beyond wants. And it was for this
reason that I proposed giving institutional expression to the percep-
tion that "nature exists for itself" 47 by taking steps to recognize "rights"
39. Sagoff 225.
40. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav. 617, 636 (1973) (emphasis deleted).
41. Sagoff 219.
42. Id. at 221.
43. Id. at 218.
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id. at 216, 224-25.
46. [The] view that values and ends are reducible to logically arbitrary expressions
of will or desire proves to be profoundly unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons, not
the least of which is the fact that anyone who accepts it must regard every statement
about how society "should" be organized or how individual wants "should" be ag-
gregated as merely expressive of the speaker's subjective preferences.
Tribe, supra note 40. at 637 (footnote omitted). See Plastic Trees 1325.
47. Plastic Trees 1346.
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in natural objects, not as a way of broadening the class of wants to
be aggregated in a Benthamite calculus, but rather as part of a struc-
ture for approaching a shared agreement about our responsibilities
as persons-responsibilities to one another and to the world. In such
a perspective, invoking notions like the "desire [of animals] to be
free from pain"481 serves simply to establish the basis for an empathy
without which the very idea of duties to the nonhuman world could
not, in all likelihood, be seriously entertained. It is easy to confuse
the proposition that empathy is a precondition of perceived obligation
with the notion that such empathy permits us to approximate, as in-
terests to be cumulatively maximized, the wants and desires of other
beings. The latter position, which Sagoff assumes to be mine, is of
course vulnerable to the attack he makes; the former is no more than
a recognition of the probable psychological reality that we are capable
of affirming duties, at least in the first instance, only to beings that
are somehow like ourselves. But it is important to see that the idea of
such duties is itself ultimately independent of a desire-satisfying con-
ception. To speak of "rights" rather than "wants," after all, is to
acknowledge the possibility that want-maximizing or utility-maxi-
mizing actions will be ruled out in particular cases as inconsistent
with a structure of agreed-upon obligations. It is Kant, not Bentham,
whose thought suggests the first step toward making us "different




If the ensuing process of development is to avoid the equally un-
acceptable trap of total human subservience to some single set of
changeless principles, then its central characteristic must be communal
choice in terms of principles "capable of evolution as we change
in the process of pursuing them." 50 In thus describing a possible
"first turn along the spiral of process . . . toward an evolving en-
vironmental ethic,"5' I recognized the obvious inadequacies of the
very step I had proposed but sought strength in that recognition:
"insistence on the continuing reformulation and evolution of the
principles [tentatively] distilled . . . provides a way of [overcoming]
the inevitable inadequacies at each stage."
'52
48. Id. at 1341.
49. Id. at 1346.
50. Id. at 1338.
51. Id. at 1346.
52. Id.
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The reader will detect here an emphasis on deliberate change that
is not altogether familiar in our legal and political tradition. Any
demand that "the framework for choice must incorporate procedures
for its own evolution" 53 has conventionally been deemed satisfied
by a tolerably responsive set of lawmaking institutions tracing their
continuing legitimacy to an underlying authority that all affected
individuals would, on reflective consideration, voluntarily accept. In
effect, it has traditionally been thought that the legislature's represen-
tative character affords sufficient assurance that its enactments will not
too long remain out of phase with evolving public sentiment; the
existence of a lag in particular cases has not customarily been deemed
a basis for antimajoritarian intervention. But courts, at least, have
begun to act as though they recognized areas-the preservation of
nature may be one-in which a variety of systemic features combine
to thwart the ordinary processes of moral evolution and growth. Let
me explain by indicating how judges have dealt with such areas.
This will make more tangible the notion of self-correcting process,
a notion crucial to my earlier article and at the heart of my dis-
agreement with Sagoff.
A first illustration might be drawn from the Supreme Court's in-
sistence in capital cases that juries be composed in such a way as
to reflect (more immediately than legislatures ever could) shifting
public attitudes toward the penalty of death. The Court thought
such a requirement necessary to "maintain a link between contem-
porary community values and the penal system-a link without which
the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "54
Second, even though "the Constitution does not require legislatures
to reflect . . . shifting social standards," 55 the failure to do so in
extreme situations may indirectly trigger judicial invalidation. For
the Supreme Court has begun to treat as wholly irrational, and hence
as violative of due process, laws that make sense-but that make "sense"
only in terms of values and conceptions so out of touch with contem-
porary ideas that government is no longer willing to press such values
and conceptions in the laws' defense.5 6
Decisions of this latter sort are easiest to understand if one re-
gards the processes of making and applying law as involving a con-
53. Id. at 1339.
54. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
55. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
56. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 & n.9 (1974); id at
653 & n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
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tinuing dialogue, one in which it is required that laws, unlike naked
commands, be explained to those they touch. Just as an individual
about to be deprived by government of life, liberty, or property is
entitled, as a matter of procedural due process, to an explanation
of why the rule being invoked by government applies to him,57 so
he is entitled, as a matter of what I would call "structural" due
process, to an explanation of why the rule is being enforced at all.
And something can hardly count as an "explanation" in this context
unless the reasons offered rationally fit the rule being defended, quite
apart from any assessment of the substantive acceptability of the reas-
ons being advanced. Although no such interchange on the merits
between the individual and the state could be demanded within tra-
ditional theories tracing the legitimacy of laws to their initial enact-
ment, it is profoundly corrupting to a community for its laws to be
sustained on theories that its current representatives are unwilling
to avow.
Some such conception in turn helps to illuminate the third and
final set of cases in which courts have lately confronted institutional
obstacles to self-correcting process. I have in mind the little-under-
stood" cases in which school boards were forced to abandon the
automatic disqualification of pregnant teachers50 and those in which
courts and agencies were compelled to end their absolute prohibitions
against child custody by unwed fathers.60 In both instances, the rules
struck down originated in once broadly held views of the proper role
of men and women and the needs of children. But those views no
longer commanded general assent. It is striking, moreover, that the
agencies affected by the Court's decisions had been in a position to
prevent the emergence of an alternative consensus if not to prevent
the erosion of the old agreement. For those were the agencies that could
insulate the community from the very experiences (seeing pregnant
teachers in the classroom, observing motherless families in the neigh-
borhood) that could generate a viable alternative consensus.0' Thus
the Supreme Court's demand that these agencies substitute more indi-
vidualized determinations for the rules of thumb (the "irrebuttable
57. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
58. For an example of the confusion about these cases, see Note, The Irrebuttable
Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
59. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
60. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
61. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not in fact address these bureau-
cratic realities in its opinion. In that regard, I have been less interested in why the Court
has recently fastened on the mode of analysis represented by these decisions than in when,
if at all, the use of such analysis might be justified.
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presumptions") they had inherited from a prior era arguably makes
sense as a means of unfreezing the situation despite the risks of abuse
and irregularity always implicit in ad hoc, discretionary judgments.
In each set of cases discussed above, it also turns out-most signifi-
cantly-that the process effectively mandated by judicial decision is
more than instrumental; it is "a process valued in large part for its
intrinsic qualities"0 12 rather than exclusively for its likely tendency
to contribute to an evolving moral consensus. For example, in the
cases involving pregnant teachers and unwed fathers, the Court's re-
jection of formal resolution by detached reference to determinate
rules might be thought to reflect a view of individualized, face-to-
face confrontation as the only fitting response (quite apart from its
problematic long-term efficacy) to a particular moral predicament: the
presence of generally agreed-upon rights, in a context characterized by
profound disagreement. Because those cases involved the fundamental
rights of parenthood, rights whose basic existence was unquestioned,
they were thought appropriate for the traditional due process re-
quirement of a prior hearing. At the same time, the exercise of those
rights interacted with issues of sex roles as to which social norms
were changing and about which there was substantial moral dissension.
That circumstance made categorical, rule-bound resolution inappro-
priate. For when substantive rules cease to be faithful expressions
of shared ideals, they come instead to enforce (and to be perceived as
enforcing) the interests and ends of some at the expense of the interests
and ends of others. In this sense, perhaps only personalized justice can
be acceptable in settling disputes about broadly agreed-upon rights
when such disputes arise in settings of widely perceived moral flux.
In such settings, the insistence on individualization is paradigmatic of
processes selected at once for their intrinsic characteristics and for their
instrumental place in an evolving system of beliefs and attitudes.
I offer this series of somewhat disparate decisions without pur-
porting to frame them within a coherent theory-a task which I ad-
dress in two forthcoming articles63 I put the cases forth here simply as
illustrations of how institutions and processes might facilitate the
evolution of principles, and of the consciousness that lies behind
them, without succumbing to "the grip of instrumentalism" 4 in
the very process of such facilitation.
62. Plastic Trees 1339.
63. L. Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions (forth-
coming, 1975, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.); L. Tribe, Structural Due Process: Articulated Ra-
tionales, Conclusive Presumptions, and Non-Positivist Grounds for Constitutional Decision
(forthcoming, 1975, HARV. Civ. RcmTs-Civ. LiB. L. Rav.).
64. Plastic Trees 1339.
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VI
It is undoubtedly in my emphasis upon process and change that
my conceptions of nature, of policy, and of constitutional structure
all differ most fundamentally from Sagoff's. For him, the "nature" that
deserves protection is definable in traditional terms; for me, "con-
ceptions like harmony, rootedness in history, connectedness with the
future, all seem more pertinent than the ultimately conventional con-
cept of 'the natural.' "6- For him, the right policy is always the one
to which the society's past, as revealed by the contemporary symbols
of its values, unambiguously points.6 For me, the "right" policy is one
chosen not to imitate an idealized past but to seek, even tentatively,
an imagined future. For him, the Constitution is a repository for cul-
tural and historic ideals; for me, it is a far leaner procedural frame-
work-an "idealized conception of how change should be structured"0' 7
-that is itself in continual change, moving, one may hope, toward an
increasingly authentic (because increasingly undominated) consensus
of ultimate ends.08 I am the first to admit that this conception leaves
the hard operational questions unanswered. In my two forthcoming
articles, 09 I try to develop the conception to a somewhat more op-
erative stage. But even if that effort proves unsuccessful, pretending to
answer operational questions by reading the entrails of history seems
to me plainly insufficient. For we are called upon not merely to re-
member the past. We are called upon as well to learn from the future.
65. Id. at 1340.
66. Sagoff 241, 264.
67. Plastic Trees 1338.
68. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLMCS (forthcoming 1975).
69. See note 63 supra.
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